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Abstract 
Aircraft icing causes performance degrada- 
tion in aircraft. When a significant amount of degra- 
dation occurs aircraft accidents occur which result 
in the lost of life and property. Currently sensors 
measure the amount of ice buildup only at specific 
points on the aircraft. Icing flight tests conducted 
by NASA Lewis Research Center to investigate the 
efects of tailplane icing. Analysis of this data indi- 
cates that it is possible to detect the onset of aircraft 
icing by utilizing a gain scheduled Beard-Jones De- 
tection Filter(BJDF). Specifically the case of a failed 
de-icing boot is analyzed and a detection filter is for- 
mulated to detect this failure. . 
Introduction 
This paper presents preliminary results of a tech- 
nique for detecting icing by continuously estimat- 
ing control surface effectiveness. That is to say the 
present method is less concerned with attempting to 
measure actual ice accretion than it is with the dele- 
terious effects on aircraft controllability. The feasi- 
bility of the method is validated with flight test data 
provided by the NASA Lewis Research Center. 
A study by the United Kingdom’s Civil Avia- 
tion Authority indicated that all the manufacturers 
of aircraft and a sizeable portion of commercial pilots 
interviewed for the study “regarded ice detectors as 
unreliable” [l]. The main reason for this view is that 
the detectors gave spurious readings and/or late in- 
dications of icing. The majority of commercial pilots 
seem to believe that ice accretion is readily observ- 
able from the cockpit and that the important issue 
is the effectiveness of the anti-icing equipment. 
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There are certain circumstances where this 
widely held pilot opinion may be incorrect. For ex- 
ample tail icing is generally not observable from the 
cockpit. Moreover, even if the wing de-icing is suc- 
cessful tail de-icing might not take place, particu- 
larly in the case of a failed de-icing boot on the hor- 
izontal or vertical stabilizer. 
It is the goal of the current study to detect 
icing by detecting the resulting changes in aircraft 
dynamics. The major focus for the present paper is 
to detect the loss of control surface effectiveness that 
results from icing via estimating changes in the air- 
craft dynamic model. In particular we consider the 
example of the loss of elevator effectiveness resulting 
from a failed de-icing boot during flight in icing con- 
ditions(although the method is generally applicable 
to any control surface). 
Ice accumulation on the horizontal stabilizer 
is a potentially hazardous condition particularly dur- 
ing approach and landing. Among other effects icing 
results in a major reduction of CL.,,, for any iced 
aerodynamic surface be it the horizontal stabilizer, 
vertical stabilizer, or main wing. During approach 
and especially during final approach phase of flight 
the flaps are deflected, causing an increase in down- 
wash(relative to cruise for example) that can seri- 
ously reduce the tailplane stall margin. 
The concept here is to detect the loss of ele- 
vator effectiveness due to a failed de-icing boot at an 
early phase such that appropriate pilot action can be 
taken to safely complete the flight. In this method, 
the aircraft dynamics are continuously monitored by 
appropriate computer manipulation of data from the 
attitude and/or navigation sensors. Then once the 
loss of control effectiveness resulting from uncon- 
trolled icing has been detected the flight crew can 
be notified through relevant display. 
Other previous work, [2], has attempted to 
detect icing via online parameter estimation how- 
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ever the present method is based upon continuously 
monitoring aircraft dynamics via a state estimator. 
This approach is highly computational efficient rela- 
tive to online parameter estimation. This estimator 
is of the form of a gain scheduled Beard-Jones De- 
tection Filter(B JDF), [3] and [4], which incorporates 
a state variable model for the aircraft dynamics in 
the aircraft body axes. The eigenstructure for the 
state estimator is chosen such that the output error 
residuals resulting from a hypothesized failure(eg. a 
failed de-icing boot on a horizontal stabilizer) are 
one dimensional. The hypothesized failure is readily 
detected by a statistically significant error residual 
and it can be isolated from other classes of failure 
by its direction in output space. Any other failure 
having a collinear output error residual, that is said 
to be detection equivalent to the hypothesized fail- 
ure, produces the same change in aircraft dynamics 
as the hypothesized failure. 
The observer/state estimator applicable for 
the present method is derived from a state variable 
model for the aircraft dynamics. This model in- 
cludes the effect of icing in the input matrix, refer to 
the related paper, [5], for more details. Typically in 
practice the nonlinearity in aircraft dynamics model 
is handled via gain scheduling the state transition 
matrix as a function of operating conditions. 
Normally, the robustness of such a linear 
model is not a major issue for the BJDF type ob- 
server since the closed loop error dynamics are de- 
signed to be at least asymptotically stable via the 
eigenstructure assignment. This stability is achieved 
during the design of the filter. 
Considering the example of the failed hori- 
zontal stabilizer boot, the effect of icing that can 
occur on this surface include a gradual trim change 
as the ice accretes on the surface. In addition icing 
results in a dramatic change on the horizontal tail lift 
characteristics including a large reduction in CL,,, . 
This latter effect is manifest in the dynamic model 
as a change in the input matrix. This latter change 
is in the form of a failure event vector that is the 
input vector for the dynamics of the BJDF. That is, 
this hypothesized failure results in an error residual 
along a unique direction in output space associated 
with horizontal stabilizer icing. 
In this case, detection of horizontal stabilizer 
icing resulting for example from a failed de-icing 
boot can be achieved by monitoring the output error 
residuals along the direction associated with that hy- 
pothesized failure. Optimal signal detection meth- 
ods are potentially applicable to reduce the 2 types 
of detection errors. 
This paper develops the models associated 
with such a failure and explains the design of a 
relevant BJDF. In addition the performance of the 
BJDF is demonstrated in simulation and with actual 
data from NASA Lewis Icing Research Aircraft, [6] 
flying with simulated horizontal stabilizer ice. 
Aircraft Model 
The detailed results of the analysis of the NASA 
Lewis icing research flight tests can be found in [5], 
[7], and [8]. The following equations, [9], were used 
to model the longitudinal dynamics of the twin otter 
icing research aircraft. 
2 = f(X,V) 
[i] = [ -$y++] (1) 
q = $(u2 + w2) LYEtan-’ 20 . ( > U 
F, = gSCz +T,, F, = qSC, + T, 
sz = sin(@)g, gz = cos(8)g. 
where C,,C,, and C,,, are polynomials functions of 
a, q, and 6,. A more detailed explanation of the 
variables and the model can be found in [5]. The 
functions used for the detection filter are of the form, 
c, = Xlcx + 222 + x3& + x4 (2) 
c, = ZlcY + zqq + z3a2 + Z46e + z5 (3) 
cm = mla + m2q + m3a2 + m4& + m5. (4) 
The values for the different coefficients can be found 
in [5]. The outputs are 
(5) 
Detection Filter 
The major goal of this paper is to demonstrate that 
the onset of tail icing in an aircraft can be modeled 
as a partial actuator failure and a Beard-Jones De- 
tection Filter(BJDF), [3] and [4], can be designed to 
detect this failure. A BJDF is a suboptimal state 
estimator that is designed to constrain the error 
2 
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residual due to a specific failure to a single direc- 
tion in output space. In this way if one computes 
a statistically significant error residual in the BJDF 
constrained failure direction one knows a failure has 
taken place. 
The state estimator that is implemented in a 
BJDF is of the form of a gain scheduled Luenberger 
observer which continuously computes an estimate 
of 2 of the state vector. Its dynamics are given by: 
L=&+BBu+D,(y-5) (6) 
where 6 = CZ, and where A and B are the state 
transition and input matrices of the nominal ref- 
erence model for the aircraft dynamics. The state 
vector error dynamics are of the form 
i=(A-D,C)e+fd (7) 
where E = z - 2 is the state error residual and 
fd is the input “failure” due to icing. Under rel- 
atively benign conditions there is sufficient design 
freedom(in choosing 09) to permit the output error 
residuals(e = Cs) to be constrained to a one dimen- 
sional subspace. In addition, the eigenvalues can be 
placed as a compromise between rapid response and 
minimal random error due to process or measure- 
ment noise, further research is being conducted in 
this area.. In the above formulation the failure event 
vector fd corresponds to the change in the input due 
to loss of control surface effectiveness. 
Failure Signature - 
There are four separate cases, Gflap = 
O”, lo”, 20”, and 30”, that need to be modeled. Uti- 
lizing the models obtained in [5] a failure signature 
vector was developed by linearizing the nonlinear 
models about the current operating point and sub- 
tracting the input matrices. As expected the differ- 
ence between the eigenvalues of the state transition 
matrices for the iced and un-iced cases was found 
to be negligible. Thus no changes in the A matri- 
ces needed to be modeled. A typical fd, 0” flap and 
‘ue = 57m/sec, with the system sampled at 1OOHz is 
r -0.0039 1 
fd = 03) 
Detection Space 
The first part in the design of a BJDF is to 
determine the detection space of the event vector. 
AIAA-99-0637 
This is important as the detection space contains all 
the failure event vectors that are equivalent. Ad- 
ditionally the rank of the detection space indicates 
the number of poles of the estimator which are deter- 
mined by the’ geometric constraints of the detection 
filter. Jones, [4], defines the detection space of fd, 
??I, in the following manner. 
Definition 1. Let f,-J be an event vector as- 
sociated with a failure in a system which is modeled 
in the un-failed state by (A,B, C). Let cfd # 0. 
The detection space for fd is denoted by Er and is 
the direct sum: ~~ 
where RI is the largest subspace which satisfies the 
three conditions: 
N(O)nR, =8 (10) 
Rl c N(C) (11) 
AR1 c ?& w-9 
where 0 is the system observability matrix. 
The procedure to determine the detection 
space of fi is straight forward and documented in [3] 
and [4]. Use the farlure signature to define a decou- 
pling feedback gain, Df, and a new output matrix 
c rn.7 
D f = Afd((Cfd)T(Cfd))-l(Cfd)T (13) 
Gn = (1 - Cfd((Cfd)TCfd)-1(Cfd)T)C(14) 
then form the system observability matrix, 0 for this 
system. 
U= (15) 
The detection space is then just the null space of this 
matrix, 0. Let g = Ri and for the example case (8) 
the detection space, g, is 
r -0.2457 1 
9 = (16) 
and when passed through the output matrix C this 
results in the residual projection vector 
-0.1716 
gc=cg= 2 1 0.0048 , (17) 0.9852 
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BJDF Design for Flight Test Data 
The design of the BJDF for the flight test 
data has four degrees of freedom. The closed loop 
poles must be selected. The first closed pole is the 
pole associated with the detection vector space. In 
this case the pole was placed at X = 0.97. This 
roughly corresponds to the linearized short period 
dynamics, wap = 3rnd/sec, sampled at 1OOHz and 
was found. to give good results. Further research 
needs to be done to determine the optimal choice for 
this pole location. The choice of this pole determines 
part of the total feedback gain, D, = Dpl + Dpz, 
where 
DPI = (-Uci +Afd)((Cfd)T(Cfd))-l(Cfd)T. (18) 
The system can then be decomposed in the unob- 
servable part caused by this feedback gain and the 
still available observa,ble part. The poles of the re- 
maining observable part, P =closed loop poles, were 
placed by using Linear Quadratic Estimator theory 
and for the example used above were placed at 
(19) 
The simulated performance of the gain scheduled de- 
tection filter is shown in Figure 1, Figure 2, and 
Figure 3. Figure 1 shows the directional error, 
e&r = gTe, versus time for the simulated noiseless 
nominal and iced cases. The constant difference be- 
tween the nominal case and the iced case from the 
start of the simulation to the start of the elevator 
input is the error due to the trim change because 
of icing. The larger errors occur when the eleva- 
tor excitation occurs and represent the reduction in 
the input matrix, B. In Figure 2 and Figure 3 the 
magnitude of e&r = g:e is plotted versus the angle 
between the two vectors. This is the magnitude of 
the error in the failure detection space. 
Results 
The nominal flight test cases and the failed boot 
flight test cases were run throught the gain sched- 
uled BJDF. The results are presented in Tables 1 
through 5, where (~0 is the trim angle of attack and 
Ue is the airspeed in meters/set.. In all but one case, 
high (Y and 6Fl,,p = 0, the maximum directional error 
for the failed boot case was higher than the nominal 
case. The one case where this is not true is not a 
AIAA-99-0637 
Figure 1: Simulated Directional Error and Elevator 
Input Gfrap = 0”, (~0 x 3.5”, ‘1~0 = 57m/sec 
practical flight condition for commercial twin turbo- 
prop aircraft. In Figure 4 the directional error and 
elevator input are shown for two comparable iced 
and nominal cases. Although there is not enough 
data to drawn any statistical conclusions the ratio 
of failure signal to nominal signal in Table 1 is ~13.2. 
In Figures 5 and 6 [e&l is plotted versus the angle 
bewtween gC and e. In Figure 4 the two large error 
spikes at 6 and 8 seconds in Figure 4 can be seen 
as the two large excursions from the ball near zero 
in Figures 5 and 6. These spikes correspond to the 
periods of greatest excitation. 
In Figure 7 the case of 6Flap = 30” is shown. 
The polar plots of the errors are shown in Figures 9 
and 8. The ratio of the failure signal to the nominal 
signal in Table 4 is as high as ~3. This indicates that 
at this flap setting there is a very good chance that 
icing can be detected. This is also the most dan- 
gerous circumstance since it is near tail stall. When 
the flight test were being performed the elevator au- 
thority went virtually to zero at &Flap = 40”. At 
high CY and high dFlap a plane undergoing icing has 
a low tail stall margin. This has been known but it 
is also clear from the amount of error produced by 
the detection filter under such conditions. 
Further work needs to be done to determine 
the best signal processing to be done on the error 
residuals to minimize detection errors. Additionally 
the optimal pole placement of the detection filter 
poles needs to be investigated. 
Conclusion 
Preliminary results of a technique for detecting air- 
4 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronuatics 
(c)l999 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics 
AIAA-99-0637 
270 
Figure 2: Simulated Directio-nal Error Polar Plot 
Gflap = O”, (~0 23 3.5”, uo x 57mlsec 
Table 1 bFlap = 0" 
Failed Boot 1 QO 1 Us 1 Directional emaz 
F 3.57 1 56.7 1 0.0126 
craft icing by continuously estimating control surface 
effectiveness have been presented. A BJDF was used 
which is not concerned with attempting to measure 
the ice accretion but rather with the deleterious ef- 
fects on aircraft controllability. Finally the BJDF 
method was applied to icing research flight test data 
from NASA Lewis and the viability of the method 
demonstrated. 
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Figure 3: Simulated Directional Error Polar Plot 
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Figure 5: Nominal Directional Error Polar Plot 
6flap = O”, LYO R 3.5”, uo z 57mlsec 
I 
F 1 -3.33 t 42.2 1 0.0771 
N -4.12 42.5 0.0253 
F -0.59 37.1 0.0605 
I 
N 1 -0.98 1 35.5 1 0.0230 I 
F 4.11 31.7 0.0470 
N 3.09 31.5 0.0146 
_- .- 
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Figure 6: Failed Boot Directional Error Polar Plot 
Bflap = O”,ffO M 3.5”,u0 2 57mlsec 
Figure 7: Directional Error and Elevator Input 
Gflap = 3O”,a0 M -3.5”,u0 ~5 42.4mlsec 
Figure 8: Directional Error Polar Plot Gflap = 




Figure 9: Dire@ional Error Polar Plot &flop = 
30”, a-J M -3.5”,?@ M 42.4mlsec I_ - 
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